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1. Introduction
This paper is part of a larger project which seeks to create a database of public
bodies, their establishment, mutations and deaths, in Ireland from the foundation
of the state in 1922. In order to do this it is necessary to have some analytical
frame for distinguishing public bodies from other organisations, so as to include
the former and exclude the latter. Within the group to be included it is necessary
to provide some differentiation between different types of public bodies so that
researchers using the database can readily identify the different roles and
obligations associated, for example with being a division of a ministerial
government department, as compared with being a publicly owned limited
company. Such differentiation also allows users of the database to discover
changes in the overall makeup of state bodies, their operational modes and
accountability structures and to test hypotheses concerning the fragmentation or
centralization of state functions and proliferation of agencies.
A starting point in this paper is the analysis of the ownership of agencies and,
relatedly, their legal form. An analysis is also offered of the functions of agencies,
divided between their generic functions and their policy domain. Thus function
refers to distinctions between operational modes – regulation, transfers of funds,
policy making, etc – whilst domain refers to the policy area – health, education,
etc. Whilst it is important to know about the form and function of public agencies,
there are important additional dimensions to their public status. Three further
indices of ‘publicness’ are analysed in the paper – funding, authority and
accountability. Most public agencies derive their resources from public funds
voted by the Oireachtas each year. Some organisations which would generally
be considered to be non-governmental organisations and for whom there is no
direct delegation of public power nevertheless derive a substantial part of their
funding from public sources. Educational bodies are a key example. There are,
conversely, a number of agencies which are publicly owned and exercise public
authority which are substantially resourced from private funds. Regulatory
agencies provide the key examples here.
The identification of form, functions, domains and funding does not tell us how
public agencies secure and exercise their power, and the following section
considers the various bases for governmental action, including a consideration of
variety in authority, extending beyond state bodies. The analysis allows that
some bodies, otherwise private in terms of form and ownership nevertheless
exercise public power.
The final area for analysis in the paper is the accountability matrix applying to
public agencies. The extent of accountability obligations applying to public
agencies comprises a continuum in which some bodies are subject to all forms of
public accountability. These mechanisms include accountability to the
Oireachtas, courts, audit, ombudsman, and so on. Other agencies with significant
public elements are subjected only to a more limited range of accountabilityGeary WP/4/2008 3
mechanisms. A central concern in contemporary debates about public
administration is how well the mechanisms of accountability have adapted to a
perceived fragmentation in the exercise of public power away from the traditional
focus on ministers and ministerial government departments.
Thus this paper deploys a broad conception of public agency to target and
problematise all bodies which have one or more of the following properties:
public ownership, public funding, exercise of statutory powers, subjection to
public accountability mechanisms. At one end of a continuum of publicness in
agencies are ministries, established and governed by legislation, whilst at the
other are a variety of non-governmental organisations which, variously, are
substantially funded from the public purse, exercise statutory powers and/or are
subjected to public accountability mechanisms.
Overall the identification of a core group of public agencies might be relatively
straightforward on any of the indices adopted in this paper. However the multiple
analyses offered highlight the existence of an important penumbral area and
offers some explanation for the lack of confidence in attempts to count the
numbers of public agencies in Ireland, and a methodology for developing a range
of more definitive lists using a variety of criteria.
2. Public Agencies, Ownership and Organisational Form
In this paper I deliberately adopt the term ‘public agency’ to target and to
problematize organisations to be included within the database. No single
classification of public agencies is in usage either nationally or internationally.
1
Agencies are, by definition, the agents of some principal. One understanding
sees government ministers or departments as principals delegating tasks to
agencies within their departments, or to organisations constituted separately
under legislation or by administrative circular. Within the international literature a
distinction is sometimes drawn between executive agencies, broadly within the
1 In Ireland a three way classification is used for official purposes by reference to ownership,
appointment or funding : ‘An Irish public sector organisation is defined as any employing body which:
(a) directly derives the majority of its share capital from Irish public funds, or (b) has the majority of
its Board/Executive members appointed by an Irish Minister, or (c) directly derives the majority of its
revenue from Irish public sources. The Irish public sector comprises the following administrative sub-
sectors: the Oireachtas (or National Parliament) and the Judiciary, the Civil Service, the Garda
Síochána (or National Police Force), the Defence Forces, the Local Authorities, the Health Services,
education, the Harbour Authorities and the State-Sponsored Bodies … Private sector employing
organisations are defined as the residuum’ (Humphreys and Gorman, 1987:8). (Subsequently adopted
by the Central Statistics Office, source McGauran et al The Corporate Governance of Agencies in
Ireland (2005: 31).Geary WP/4/2008 4
control of ministers, though possibly legally separate, and statutory agencies
which operate at arms-length from ministers (Thynne 2004). I suggest in this
paper that it is helpful, from an analytical perspective, to think of ministerial
departments as agencies too (Hood and Dunsire 1981), whether of the
Oireachtas or of the people.
A particular difficulty with the analysis is that the statutory or public corporation
form (referred to for consistency as statutory corporations) is used in Ireland for a
very wide array of different types of bodies including regulatory, advisory and
trading organisations, thus this set is rather undifferentiated and thus lacking
analytical purchase. There are additionally some bodies established under
legislation which do not explicitly have corporate form- I refer to these as
statutory non-departmental bodies and a range of bodies established without
legislation, the precise legal character of which is difficult to determine with
confidence.
The three way distinction between ministerial departments, executive and
statutory agencies does not exhaust the set of public agencies (Thynne 2004:
92). First there is a group of state agencies charged with overseeing government
which, while it would be odd to think of them as agencies of government, are
nevertheless performing public oversight functions. Amongst these bodies are
the Office of the Ombudsman and the Comptroller and Auditor General, both of
which might be classified as agents of the Oireachtas. Not all such bodies
overseeing government are agencies of the Oireachtas, nor are they all
established by the written constitution, so I propose to adopt a broader
classification of ‘constitutional and statutory officeholders’ (Thynne 2004) which
would include the judiciary, regulators of public service employment and human
rights. A further distinct class of agencies adopts the form of companies of
various kinds. Some commercial, but state-owned entities, are established as
statutory corporations in a manner broadly similar to that of statutory agencies
generally. Others adopt the form of private companies – public (ie listed) limited
companies, private limited (ie unlisted) companies and companies limited by
guarantee. The terms semi-state or state-sponsored companies are sometimes
used to refer to at least some of these entities, although it is not clear that this
term makes their status any clearer.
Most organisations identified as government departments and agencies are likely
to be wholly owned by government on a statutory basis. But, ownership does not
get us much further than this as the question is tied in with legal form. Legal form
varies between departments, boards and statutory corporations through to
various forms of Companies Acts companies (public companies, private
companies, companies limited by guarantee) to associations (rooted in contract).
The question of legal form is also linked to origins. The basis for the creation of
public bodies includes statute (primary or delegated), an administrative circular,
incorporation (statutory, chartered, companies acts) or association. So, forGeary WP/4/2008 5
example though the Medical Council is an example of a professional self-
regulatory body exercising statutory powers and funded privately from payments
by registered doctors, its legal status is as a statutory corporation established
under the Medical Practitioners Act 1978.
The question of ownership, origins and legal form ties in directly into issues
concerning the legitimacy of organisations, and in particular the right to appoint,
set and control budgets, and lines of accountability, whether political, legal or
financial. It is possible for legislation to assign to a minister the right to appoint
directors of a company which appears, in all other respects, to be a private
company. The establishment of or conversion of statutory corporations to listed
companies, of course, facilitates privatization, making it possible for ministers to
dispose of shares in order to divest themselves of control without the requirement
of legislation. There have been many such privatizations in recent years, for
example ACC Bank plc, ICC Bank plc and Aer Lingus plc.
A summary of the various legal forms for public agencies in Ireland, showing
examples within each category is at table 1 (cf (Hogan and Morgan 1998: 134 ff).Geary WP/4/2008 6
Legal Form Examples (Year Established
Ministry established under Ministers and
Secretaries Act 1924 or subsequent order or act
under this or amending legislation
- may include executive agencies which remain
legally part of the ministry
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (1924 – with
subsequent amendments to remit and title)
Irish Prison Service (1998)
Corporations Statutory – specific or enabling
legislation
Electricity Supply Board (1927)
RTE (1960, as Radio Éireann)
Córas Iompair Éireann (1944 as limited company, converted to
statutory corporation 1950)
VHI Healthcare (1957)
TelefÍs na Gaelige (2007, previously a subsidiary of RTE)
Equality Authority (1999)
Health Service Executive (2004)
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland (1875, 2007)
Chartered Trinity College Dublin (1592)
Royal College of Surgeons Ireland (1784)
Company Limited by Guarantee The Discovery Programme Ltd (1991)
National Concert Hall Limited (1981)
Horse Sport Ireland Ltd (2007)
National Theatre Society Ltd (Abbey Theatre) (established 1903,
Nationalised, 1925)
Irish Universities Quality Board (2006)
Public Company (listed) with
majority government shareholding
and/or golden share
Eirgrid plc (2006)
Aer Lingus Group plc (1936) (but majority shareholding sold, 2006)
Bord Na Móna plc (1946)
Unlisted (private) Company An Post (1983)
Advertising Standards Authority for Ireland (1981)
Statutory non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs)
not established as corporate bodies
Higher Education Authority (1968)
Broadcasting Complaints Commission (1977)
Non-Statutory Non-Departmental Public Bodies
(with separate legal personality?)
Taskforce on Active Citizenship (2006)
National Competitiveness Council (1997)
Constitutional Bodies Constitutional and
Statutory Office
Holders
Office of the Ombudsman (1984)
Information Commissioner (1998)
Comptroller and Auditor General (1922)
Judiciary (1922)
Tribunals – Statutory – eg Employment Appeals Tribunal (1977)
Tribunals - Non-Statutory – eg Criminal Injuries Compensation
Tribunal (1971)
Statutory
Corporations
Irish Human Rights Commission (2001)
Courts Service (1998)
Table 1: Legal Form of Public Agencies in IrelandGeary WP/4/2008 7
3. Functions
Functions fulfilled by public bodies are not necessarily unique to public bodies
and thus a functional analysis, though it might be helpful in distinguishing
different types of public bodies, is not helpful in distinguishing public bodies from
others. A list of generic functions has been elaborated from the well known list
offered by Dunleavy in which he describes five core functional types of state
agency: delivery, regulatory, transfer, contract and control and adds also taxing,
trading and service agencies (Dunleavy 1989). I have removed the category of
service agencies – these are organisations delivering services to other public
bodies (for example Local Government Computer Services Board) and I have
included them under delivery. As noted in the introduction my conception of
public agencies includes multi-function ministerial departments, so I have added
this to the list. Working from the list of public agencies in Ireland it was difficult to
incorporate some into this extended group of nine and where the issue could not
be resolved I created a further category. In some cases I did not think any of
Dunleavy’s categories apt to capture the chief function of the agency. This
includes the adjudication and grievance-handling agencies, the investigatory
agencies, advisory/consultative bodies, representative/advocacy bodies,
research and information providing bodies. In one instance, developmental
agencies, it might have been possible to include these under other headings (for
example trading, delivery) but the creation of an additional function adds
something to the analysis which will follow.
Generic Function Irish Examples (Date of Creation)
Adjudication/Grievance
Handling
Censorship of Films Appeals Board (1923)
The Labour Court (1946)
Broadcasting Complaints Commission (1977)
Office of the Ombudsman (1984)
Censorship of Publications Appeals Board (1946)
Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal (1971)
Employment Appeals Tribunal (1977)
An Bord Pleanála (1977)
Rent Tribunal (1979)
Residential Institutions Redress Board (2002)Geary WP/4/2008 8
Ombudsman Children (2002)
Pensions Ombudsman (2003)
Personal Injuries Assessment Board (2004)
Ombudsman for the Defence Forces (2004)
Garda Síochána Ombudsman (2007)
Advisory/Consultative/
Representation/Advocacy
Placenames Commission (1946)
Advisory Council for English Language Schools (1969)
Law Reform Commission (1971)
Forfás (1994)
Dublin Transportation Office (1996)
Irish Human Rights Commission (2000)
National Children’s Advisory Council (2001)
Irish Human Rights Commission (2001)
Advisory Council for Science, Technology and
Innovation(2005)
Business Regulation Forum(2005)
National Haemophilia Council (?)
Contracting National Roads Authority (1994)
The Railway Procurement Authority (2001)
Delivery Trinity College Dublin (1594)
The Turf Club (1790
University College Dublin (1854)
National Gallery of Ireland (1854)
National Museum of Ireland(?)
National Library of Ireland (1877)
Abbey Theatre (1903)
Central Bank of Ireland (1943)
Irish National Stud Co Ltd (1946)
Chester Beatty Library (1950)
Arts Council (1951)
Voluntary Health Insurance Board (1957)
Irish Greyhound Board (1958
RTE (1960)
The Local Government Computer Services Board (1971)
An Post (1984)
Culture Ireland (2005)
Developmental
(commercial and non-
commercial)
Agricultural Credit Corporation (1927) (now ACC Bank –
sold by state to Rabobank in 2002)
Industrial Credit Corporation (1933) (later ICC Bank –
sold by state 2001, now part of Bank of Scotland
(Ireland))
Industrial Development Authority (1949) (Renamed IDA
Ireland 1994)
Shannon Development (1959)
National Building Agency Ltd (1960)
Horse Racing Ireland (2001)Geary WP/4/2008 9
Information-Providing Road Safety Authority (2006)
Investigatory Criminal Assets Bureau (1996)
The Tribunal of Inquiry into Certain Planning Matters and
Payments (1997)
Ministries – General
Purpose – Policy
Formation and Execution
Department of the President of the Executive Council
(1924)
Department of Finance (1924)
Department of Justice (1924)
Department of Local Government and Public Health
(1924)
Department of Education (1924)
Department of Lands and Agriculture (1924)
Department of Industry and Commerce (1924)
Department of Fisheries (1924)
Department of Posts and Telegraphs (1924)
Department of Defence (1924)
Department of External Affairs (1924)
Regulatory (over public
and private sectors)
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland (1875)
An Garda Síochána (1922)
Film Censors Office (1923)
Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (1923)
Commissioner of Charitable Donations and Bequests
(1923)
Veterinary Council (1931)
Central Bank of Ireland (1943) and Irish Financial
Services Regulatory Authority (added 2003)
Equality Authority (1989)
Standards in Public Office Commission (2001) Health
Insurance Authority (2001)
Racing Regulatory Body (2001)
Private Security Authority (2004)
Commission for Public Service Appointments (2004)
Irish Universities Quality Board ((2002)2006)
Garda Síochána Inspectorate
Health Information and Quality Authority (2007)
Research/ Information-
Gathering
State Laboratory (1924)
Medical Research Council (1937)
Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies (1940)Geary WP/4/2008 10
Central Statistics Office (1949)
Forensic Science Laboratory (1975)
Taxing Office of the Revenue Commissioners (1923)
Trading Electricity Supply Board (1927)
Aer Lingus (1936)
Irish Life Assurance Company (1939) (privatized 1991)
Transfer Higher Education Authority (1968)
Housing Finance Agency (1978)
Table 2 Functional Differentiation of Public Bodies in Ireland – Key Examples
Some analyses explicitly exclude some of the identified functions from the
analysis of public bodies. For example the recent TASC study, which identified
482 central public bodies, excluded regulators of public and private sector,
working groups and tribunals (both investigatory and adjudicatory) (Clancy and
Murphy 2006).
A more concrete conception of function is advocated in the UN Classification of
the Functions of Government (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/family2.asp?Cl=4),
widely adopted as the international standard classification. The classification is
oriented around policy domains rather than function. COFOG consists of the
following primary categories:
 Agriculture, fisheries and forestry
 Communications
 Defence
 Education and Training
 Employment
 Enterprise and Economic Development
 Environmental Protection
 General Public Services
 Health
 Housing and Community Amenities
 International Services
 Public Order and Safety
 Recreation, culture, Religion
 Social Protection
 Transport
For research seeking to create a useable database of public bodies these
classifications are valuable in providing an exhaustive set of policy domains
which users of the database can use to limit their research. Accordingly within
the mapping project we will adopt separate fields for function and domain,
enabling users of the database to precisely identify the number all the bodies
engaging, for example, in regulation, in a particular domain, for example
environmental protection.Geary WP/4/2008 11
4. Funding
This analysis of form and function of public agencies provides a starting point for
the analysis in this paper, but only gets us so far. For example, it does not
definitively distinguish the public from the private, since many privately owned
companies are included within it. Thus, an analysis of organisational form needs
to be supplemented with consideration of ownership. We then meet the problem
that at least some functions we think of as being public functions are exercised
by organisations which are not publicly owned. This is because functions may be
contracted out or delegated under legislation or delegated implicitly because they
are tolerated, stimulated and/or financed by governmental bodies. Even if we
decide to exclude such organisations from our mapping project, we should be
aware of their role in fulfilling public functions.
The source of an organisation’s funds is a further potential index of its status, and
one with some significance for accountability (see discussion below). Some
apparently publicly owned organisations are nevertheless privately funded
through levies and fees. This is often true of regulatory organisations, though it is
common for levies to be paid to a finance ministry and organisational funds be
allocated from the finance ministry, rather than levies flow directly to the
organisation. The Commission for Communications Regulation, which is a
statutory corporation, receives more than 95 per cent of its income from levies
and licensing fees from regulated bodies. It might also be true of self-financing
trading organisations, as with some statutory corporations, such as the Electricity
Supply Board. Some organisations not owned by the state nevertheless receive
all or most of their funds from the state. Schools provide a key example in Ireland
as do a number of other educational bodies such as the National Adult Literacy
Agency. Whereas we might think of the core public sector as comprising the
publicly owned and publicly financed bodies, and the core private sector as
comprising privately owned and privately financed, it is clearly that there is a
substantial penumbra private on one indicator and public on the other (Table 3).
Ownership
Financing
Public Private
Public Ministries
Core Public Sector
Schools
Private Regulatory Bodies
Trading Organisations
Core Private Sector
Table 3 Funding Relationship to Core Public and Private SectorGeary WP/4/2008 12
A recent UK study of the regulation of public sector actors used a combined
approach based on ownership and funding to distinguish different degrees of
publicness along a continuum (Hood et al. 1999: 22). Thus government
departments, publicly owned and funded are core public sector. Statutory trading
corporations, publicly owned, but largely funded from non-state sources, are
examples of mixed public/private sector. Privately funded companies are core
private sector. Publicly funded non-state actors such as some charities and not-
for-profit organisations are mixed public/private economy.
For some purposes the identification of this substantial mixed middle ground is
unsatisfactory. The treatment of organisations by the legal system for the
purposes of judicial review, for example, can deal only with a binary classification
within which a decision is made by a public body (amenable to judicial review) or
not. Similarly the application of public audit principles, though variable across
jurisdictions, is typically tied to a binary distinction between bodies which are
publicly funded and those which are not. These accountability issues are
discussed below.
5. Forms of Authority
Ownership and legal basis shape, but may not be determinative of, the
possession of legal authority. Some forms of legal authority are possessed
equally by private as public bodies, notably that which derives from contract.
Thus private companies are as capable as government ministries of using
contracts to control behaviour of their suppliers (McCrudden 2004). Some bodies
which, in ownership terms, are private, have public law authority delegated to
them by statute. The Law Society of Ireland perhaps provide the key example of
a private organisation to which are delegated statutory powers for the regulation
of the solicitors’ profession under the Solicitors Acts. There appears to be a more
limited delegation of statutory powers to private bodies in Ireland than would be
true for the UK. Thus, enforcement of animal cruelty legislation, assigned to the
private RSPCA in the UK, is a function of the gardai in Ireland. In the case of
standardisation, the National Standards Authority of Ireland is a public
corporation, established by statute, whereas its UK counterpart, the British
Standards Institute (BSI) is a private body which receives limited public funds.
The Irish Turf Club and the Irish National Hunt and Steeplechase Committee
have statutory power to exclude persons from racecourses under the Racing
Board and Racecourses Act 1945, but this is a pretty limited example. It is
arguable that private schools have extensive delegation of public authority to
them in respect of education.
One area of implicit delegation is to the Advertising Standards Authority of
Ireland, which takes on responsibility for regulation of much of the advertising
sector including press and broadcasting. The delegation is implicit in the sense
that this is an area where we might expect statutory regulation (and have it for
broadcasting, in parallel with self-regulation) if self-regulation were not there orGeary WP/4/2008 13
not effective. In contrast with its UK counterpart, the ASAI claims its jurisdiction
from the contract entered into by its members. (The UK regime extends beyond
its membership). This factor makes it likely that the ASAI would be considered a
private body by the courts (discussed further below).
In addition to the bodies assuming authority from legislation and contract there is
a further class of public agencies. Certain non-statutory bodies have been
established by government circulars and exercise powers, for example, to make
payments, without any further legal authority.
Source of
Authority
Type of Public Body
Legislation Ministries
Statutory Corporations
Non-state bodies exercising delegated power – eg Law Society of Ireland, An
Taisce
Contract Self-Regulatory Bodies - eg ASAI
Public bodies exercising ordinary contractual power – eg procurement
contracts
Administrative
Circular
Non-Statutory Non-Departmental Body – eg Criminal Injuries Compensation
Tribunal
Table 4 Sources of Authority of Public Agencies
The nature and sources of authority for public agencies affects the accountability
matrices in which they are located, as discussed in the next section.
6. Accountability
It is conventional to conceive of public agencies has occupying a position in a
matrix of accountability involving, centrally, the Oireachtas, the courts and
various constitutional agencies such as the Ombudsman, the Comptroller and
Auditor General and the Information Commissioner. Whilst many public agencies
are subject to each of these regimes, for others that coverage is partial. The
conception of when an agency is public for the purposes of any particular
accountability regime is, in practice, highly varied.
In the case of the Oireachtas parliamentary accountability is modelled on the
assumption the ministers are accountable for all the activities within their broad
portfolio and the doctrine of collective responsibility ensures a link between all
aspects of the public administration and the Oireachtas. However the creation of
statutory executive agencies, at arms-length from ministers undermines thisGeary WP/4/2008 14
assumption and has brought forward new mechanisms for linking agencies to the
Oireachtas. In the case of the Health Service Executive, for example,
parliamentary questions are addressed not to the Minister for Health, but rather
to the Parliamentary Affairs Division of the HSE. Additionally, the obvious fact
that chief executives of agencies are not members of the Oireachtas has
increased the importance of appearances by such agency heads before select
committees, mainly in their capacity as accounting officers.
The main mechanism of judicial accountability of public agencies is the action for
judicial review in the High Court. Once considered by English authors to be
‘sporadic and peripheral’ (Smith 1980), the remarkable increase in judicial review
actions requires a reassessment of that analysis. An empirical project on the
impact of judicial review in Ireland, of the kind already undertaken in the three
main UK jurisdictions, is urgently required.
Considering the broad spectrum of public agencies, it is significant that the Irish
courts have noted but generally distinguished the English Court of Appeal
decision in City Panel on Takeovers ex p. Datafin ([1987] QB 815) in declining to
hold a variety of privately owned bodies amenable to judicial review. The Irish
courts, apparently departing from Datafin, have emphasised the need for
statutory or common law public power as underpinning the decision to be
challenged by way of judicial review. Where a decision maker gets their power
from contract or agreement the decision is not amenable to judicial review (eg
Quinn v Honourable Society of King’s Inns (2004] IEHC 220, Unreported)). There
is a modest departure from this principle in Eogan v UCD ([1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 302)
and Becker v Duggan ([2005] IEHC 376) where the powers of the decision maker
were ‘not directly based on statute, [but] depended on approval by the legislature
or the Government for their continued exercise’.
Beyond parliamentary and judicial accountability are the regimes associated with
the variety of constitutional agencies, established over the past 85 years. The
oldest of these is the Comptroller and Auditor General, provided for under Article
33 of the Constitution, but continuing the work of the old Exchequer and Audit
Department which pre-dated independence. The constitutional scope of the
C&AG’s responsibilities is the audit of all monies authorised or controlled by the
Oireachtas. The scope of such audits has been extended beyond the traditional
concern checking that money is spent as authorised to the more modern value
for money audit in respect of selected public functions. Agencies where are in
some sense public but not dependent on monies authorised or controlled by the
Oireachtas fall outside the C&AG’s jurisdiction.
Under the Freedom of Information Act 1997 an organisation is a public body
within the terms of the Act if is listed in Schedule 1. Whilst that Schedule
operates chiefly by way of a list, Schedule 1 (5) gives considerable discretion to
ministers to exclude or include certain bodies from the scope of the Act. Thus a
company wholly or partly owned or financed wholly or partly from public financesGeary WP/4/2008 15
can be included within the scope of the legislation as can any other organisation
partly or wholly funded from public funds. Additionally the requirements of the Act
can be applied to any body which ‘functions in relation to the general public or a
class of the general public stand conferred by any enactment’ . This could cover
the Law Society of Ireland and other private bodies exercising statutory powers.
The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 works not with a list
(subject to addition or exclusion) but rather the general definition that its
provisions apply to ‘every organ of the state’.
‘‘‘organ of the State’’ includes a tribunal or any other body (other than the
President or the Oireachtas or either House of the Oireachtas or a
Committee of either such House or a Joint Committee of both such
Houses or a court) which is established by law or through which any of the
legislative, executive or judicial powers of the State are exercised;’
(s.1(1)).
The Ombudsman has had cause to complain about the limited scope of her
jurisdiction, which is centred on government departments, local authorities and
certain key service providers, notably An Post and the Health Service Executive.
The presence of An Post in the list is curious since, as a trading organisation,
some would think it much less within the core public sector than many other
organisations, such as the Garda Siochana. And if An Post is within the
jurisdiction then why not the ESB and Bord Gais? The borders between public
bodies and the rest for Ombudsman purposes may be contingent on particular
policy choices, for example an historic commitment to protecting the Garda from
Ombudsman scrutiny, in favour of establishing investigative tribunals in the most
serious cases of alleged wrongdoing. This policy has seen a change with the
establishment of the Garda Ombudsman in 2007.
The penumbral area of constitutional agencies includes both NGOs and
supranational organisations which hold public bodies to account over their
actions. Many NGOs implicitly take on oversight functions over government. An
Taisce (established 1948), which has some delegated public functions, for
example, describes as being amongst its core functions the role of ‘impartial
monitor on the application of EU environmental legislation at local level’
(http://www.antaisce.org/campaigns/an-taisce, visited 9 October 2007). Treaty
obligations taken on by the Irish government create supranational oversight, for
example in respect of implementation of EU legislation and expenditure of EU
funds, not only by the European Commission, but also the European Court of
Auditors. Similarly, in the human rights domain, Treaty Obligations create a
monitoring role for the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
7. Conclusions
The essence of what is public and private is difficult to pin down. Few would deny
that ministries and many statutory non-departmental public bodies are public in
character because their existence and activities are largely, if not exclusively,Geary WP/4/2008 16
carried out within their statutory mandate using public funds. If statutory authority
alone were the basis of ‘publicness’ then no distinction would be made between
these obviously public bodies on the one hand and a range of non-state actors
which exercise public functions under delegated legislation. It might be argued
that the Law Society of Ireland is not like a ministry because it does things which
are not within the mandate created by legislation. But, is it not equally true of
ministries, statutory corporations and non-departmental public bodies that they
do at least some things not fully anticipated in legislation?
It is of the essence of a statutory corporation with trading functions that it can act
commercially, within the boundaries of its legislative authority. This idea is
captured in Ireland by the use of the term “semi-state bodies”. Is this a misnomer
(Barrington 1980: 57)? Such bodies are established under statute, but, when
successful will typically receive much or all of their current funding from
transactions (the position for capital funding may be different). These bodies are
subject to public sector accounting rules and other public sector financial
constraints.
Regulatory bodies are established and act under legislative authority but some,
like many statutory corporations, collect their funding from private sources. Some
would say that levies and licence fees are simply taxes, levied under statutory
authority and that such bodies should be regarded as core public sector.
Perhaps the most difficult case is presented by bodies with no statutory mandate,
no public ownership and no public funds, for which the Advertising Standards
Authority of Ireland and the new Office of Press Ombudsman and Press Council
of Ireland are key examples. The legal authority of such bodies to act, such as it
is, must derive from contractual arrangements between members. Such
arrangements appear no different from a the purchasing contract of a large
company which imposes various requirements on a supplier, and which may
include compliance with certain third party codes or standards and mechanisms
for monitoring and enforcement. If there is a difference, it may that which has
been identified by the English Court of Appeal when it said of the activities of the
UK Takeover Panel that if it were not there to perform its functions then
government would need to establish a statutory body to fulfil them, and the Panel
was, therefore amenable to judicial review. But such an argument is rather
artificial. There are many functions that might call forth a legislative response if
the disappeared or did not exist, but such responses depend on timing,
resources, and perhaps media influence. Such counterfactual exercises are
therefore a shaky basis for defining ‘publicness’, and have not found much favour
in Ireland.
The paper does not, then, offer a definitive list of public agencies in Ireland.
Rather it lays bare the variety of considerations to be made in determining the
parameters of public agencies. Beyond this classificatory dimension, the exerciseGeary WP/4/2008 17
is revealing of some significant trends in the establishment and functioning of
public agencies.
One important set of claims concerning public agencies concerns their
fragmentation during recent periods of public management reform. For any
particular state arguments about fragmentation beg the question first, what was
the starting point, in terms of organisational forms for public management, and
how have these been re-cast? Such an analysis provides the basis for
challenging the fragmentation hypothesis where fragmented public management
reforms are found that pre-date the convulsions dated from the 1970s. Within the
Westminster-type systems it is sometimes assumed that the starting point is the
highly centralized model of government (multi-purpose, central government
departments and multi-purpose local authorities) which characterised public
management in the UK between the wars. In Ireland the Free State Constitution
of 1922 provided for the creation of an Executive Council (cabinet) to comprise
between five and seven ministers appointed by the Representative of the Crown
and with a maximum of 12 ministers in total, each to head a department. Greater
specificity on the establishment of departments was provided by the Ministers
and Secretaries Act 1924 .
However it has been suggested that in states with greater developmental
requirements than the UK more fragmented models were adopted in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Key examples are found in Canada and
Australia (Wettenhall 2003: 222-3). Though the initial ambition was to consolidate
the various inherited boards and corporations within ministerial control of the
Free State Government in Ireland it is apparent that the perceived demands of
the developmental state caused significant fragmentation within a few years, with
large numbers of new public bodies springing up from 1927. Consequently the
ambitions of the 1924 Act, to locate all responsibility for public functions with
ministers, were rapidly undermined (Hogan and Morgan 1998: 112).
The proliferation of regulatory agencies in more recent times has already been
much commented on (including adverse comments by a number of ministers). At
least as striking is the rise of the adjudicatory agency in Ireland, a phenomenon
which requires further exploration. The analysis of these trends create a further
challenging agenda for public administration research in Ireland, beyond the
completion of a comprehensive database of central public agencies.Geary WP/4/2008 18
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